THE LEADERSHIP OF ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS IN INDONESIA POSTSUHARTO: IDENTIFYING THE MISSING LINK BETWEEN THE MOVEMENTS

Main Article Content

Lili Yulyadi Arnakim

Abstract

This paper attempts to analyze the missing link between various Islamic movements
post-Suharto era. Upon the abolition of “azas tunggal” as the sole ideological base
of social and political movements during Habibie’s administration, many Islamic
movements emerged and some Islamic organizations reaffirmed their basic
principles to al-Qur’an and Sunnah. Some of these movements have been
transformed into political parties and participated in the ongoing democratization
process. The paper argues that Islamic movements are not monolithic movement.
There are divided into several Islamic organizations and political parties and that
require networks that link and exchange their ideas so that they can reach the same
objective through various channels. Finally the paper identifies sources of difference
and the potential means for building networks between them and with the other
Islamic movement across the Muslim world.
Keywords: Exclusivity, movements, transformation, democratization, and networks
INTRODUCTION
Islam in Indonesia is not a monolithic community and Muslims are not united in
one single political party or movement. In his classical study on Islam in Java,
Clifford Geertz has argued that Islam in Indonesia can be classified into three
groups based on the social cultural milieu: santri (practicing Muslim), abangan
(nominal Muslim) and priyayi (elite class from abangan).1 This categorization
furthermore is reducible to two types namely; santri and abangan. Even though this
classification is useful analytical devices and has been used by many Indonesianists
in their study of Islam in Indonesia, it has been criticized for being amenable to
change over time and less relevant to contemporary practice of Islam in Indonesia.
For Douglas Ramage argues that “…the applicability of santri/abangan distinctions
(classification) for understanding Islam and/or national politic is increasingly less
relevant today.”2
From a different perspective, Jalaluddin Rakhmat, an Indonesian Muslim
Scholar, defines ummat Islam (Islamic community) in five ways. First, nominal
Muslims who declare themselves Muslims but do not practice Islamic teaching in
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their daily life. This group would be called as abangan/priyayi in Geertz’s
classification. Second, Muslims who practice daily ritual activities such as
performing prayers, alms giving, fasting, and hajj. Third, knowledgeable Muslims
who have sufficient knowledge of Islamic teaching. Fourth, devout Muslims who
attempt to conduct themselves in accordance with Islamic teaching. Finally,
fundamentalist Muslims who believe that Islam is an ideology and try to establish
an Islamic state or at least an Islamic society based on the shari’ah.3 These Islamic
communities further divide into different Islamic movements. Before analyzing the
Islamic movements in Indonesia post Suharto, it is worth addressing that form of
Islam in Indonesia is sunni and falls into two major movements: Modernist and
traditionalist.
Muslim modernist in Indonesia grew out of the Egyptian reform movement
and in response to indigenous nationalism at the turn of the century. It drew
inspiration from the reform ideas of the anti-colonial, pan-Islamist Jamal al-Din al
Afghani (1983-1897) and father of modernism Muhammad Abduh (1845–1905).
Representing Muslim modernism in Indonesia were organizations like Sarekat
Dagang Islam (SDI) (1905), Muhammadiyah (1912) and Persatuan Islam (1923). The
modernist organization mostly appealed to a socio-economic class of educated
urban elites and merchant traders. They gave priority to education, social welfare
programs and dakwah activities.4
Muhammadiyah was the main modernist Islamic movements and the second
largest mass organization In Indonesia with estimated membership more than 30
millions members. After the declaration of Indonesian independence in 1945, the
Muslim modernists founded young modernist organizations. These included
Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia (the Indonesian Movement of Islamic Youth,
GPII) in 1945, Pelajar Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Students’ Association,
PII) in 1946, and Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (The association of Islamic University
Students, HMI) in 1947. Members of Dewan Dakwah Islamiyyah Indonesia (DDII)
as well as the controversial organization, Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia
(Association of Indonesia Muslims Intellectuals, ICMI), are products of a modernists
background.
In contrast, traditionalists led by two prominent religious scholars known as
Kiai, Wahab Hasbullah and Hasyim Asy’ari founded the Nahdlatul Ulama in 1926
as a response to the growth of Muslim modernism. The traditionalist rejects the
efforts to purify the religious teaching from local superstition and in order to protect
the economic and social-religious interests of pesantren. However, since the last
decade, NU has become a diverse and complex organization with a decentralized
structure largely based on personalistic and informal networks and authority of
individual kiai who run a system of traditional Islamic Boarding schools mainly in
rural Java. Much of the authority of NU kiai is hereditary. NU has an estimated
membership of over than 40 millions people.5 Many newly established Islamic
movements basically originated from NU personalities. For instance, Majelis
Mujahiddin Indonesia (Indonesian council of Mujahidin) led by Abu Bakar Basyir,
Fron Pembela Islam (Islamic Defenders’ Front) by Habib Reziq Syihab, Short lived
Laskar Jihad led by Ja’afar Umar Thalib from Ahli Sunnah wal Jama’ah forum. As
such this paper attempts to analyze the main contemporary Islamic movements in
Indonesia and further analyze the links between them.
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A DIAGNOSTIC ANALYSIS OF ISLAMIC MOVEMENT:
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Islamic movement is expected to follow and commit to Islamic principles and values.
In analyzing any Islamic movement, Malik Badri has highlighted four components
namely: cognitive, affective, behavioral, and spiritual in line with commitment to
the movement.6 These components are determinant factors for Islamic movements to
succeed in facing the challenge of the contemporary world.
The cognitive component of Islamic commitment according to Malik Badri,
is something to do with Iman. It is undoubtedly the rational and cognitive aspect
of the religion. Basically it is to know and believe in Laa ilaha Illa Allah. To be
informed and have faith in the tawhid of Allah and His exalted attributes; to know
and believe in His Angels, books and Messengers and to be rationally convinced
that this universe is the creation of the One Almighty God and that there is
resurrection and a day of judgment. The cognitive aspect should also include
knowledge of shari’ah about the duties and responsibilities of Muslims as
individuals and as an ummah.7 As such it includes various major issues in individual
life such as ritual worship, personal responsibility and public affairs i.e. the nature
of Islamic governance, jihad and relations with other fellow human beings (Muslims
and non-Muslims).
The affective component is also derived from Iman as it relates to the heart
and feelings such as affection and emotions. Muslims’ belief should not be rational
one of the neutral mind. It must be warmed by the second component of Iman,
which is the affective and emotional motive generated by the heart. This includes
feelings such as deep appreciation and love of God, His prophet and of the Muslim
brothers and sisters or anger and hostility at those who strive to block the way of
Allah and give support to His enemies.8
The third component is the combination of the two that binds the mind and
the heart. It culminates in the behavioral or practical component of actual deeds.
Islam basically involves the practical applications of worshipping such as prayers,
fasting, Hajj, and zakat. At the macro level, Islam would include all the deeds that
emanate from these practices such as jihad, being good to parents, avoiding sin and
performing any deed that pleases Allah.
Finally, the real pinnacle of iman and the main goal of ibadah and Islamic
commitment is basically the spiritual dimension. Malik Badri confessed that when
we discuss the spiritual component, one may refer only to its effect as a process of
the tazkiyyah and cleansing of the heart or soul.9 This level is basically the station
in which a Muslim is bestowed with tranquility, intimate serenity and a submissive
feeling of joy that no words can translate. It can only be achieved by offering more
voluntary prayers at night (qiyamullail), voluntary fasting, deep contemplation
(tafakkur) in God’s creation and continual remembrance or Dzikir of Allah ta’alla.
EMERGENCE OF ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS DURING POST
SUHARTO ERA
Islamic movements in Indonesia have been a dynamic force. Since the arrival of
Islam in Indonesia in the early years of Hijrah or the 7th/8th century CE, It has
played a significant role in the development of the nation. The colonial period
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notably expedited the spread of Islam and the religion can not be separated from
the history of modern Indonesia. It was to some extent considered as a source of
troublemaker for the colonial Dutch. Though the Dutch policies, neutral and
assimilation policies that embodied the secularism, sought to weaken Islam as
political force, Islam retained its nature as a comprehensive way of life.
As a matter of fact, Muslims who went on pilgrimage, would stay in Mecca
and study Islam for years. After they mastered the Islamic teachings they returned
home and conveyed Islamic teachings to their own people. As a result the Islamic
reformist movement had actively purified the Islamic teaching from non-Islamic
customary ancestors. The Muslim leaders formed a organization of Muslim traders
and businessmen known as Sarekat Dagang Islam (SDI) in 1905 as a response to the
growing number of Chinese traders. SI was considered as the first Nationalist
movement in the history of Indonesia. It later changed and became Sarekat Islam
(SI) in 1911. With the increasing exposure in Mecca while performing Pilgrimage,
the reformist Muslims formed an organization known Muhammadiyyah, under the
leadership of K.H. Ahmad Dahlan in 1912. In response to the mergence of reformist
Muslim groups, traditionalist Muslims who defended local traditions established
Nahdhatul Ulama (NU) in the 1926, led by the KH Hasyim As’ary. Islamic
movements have played a significant role in establishing Indonesia.
However, Islamic movements were not given an opportunity to play political
role during the Guided Democracy and the early phase of New Order era. The
influence of Islamic movements has only really been felt in Indonesian politics in
the 1990s when Suharto’s government attempted to accommodate Islamic (Muslim)
interest in domestic policy due to certain significant changes of the domestic
environment.10 This was evident in Suharto’s personal life and various domestic
policies to favor Muslims. It was a significant shift for modern Indonesia. In 1989,
Suharto and his allies in the parliament endorsed a draft of the shari’ah court with
special reference to the Islamic family laws.11 Two years later, Suharto agreed to
be a patron of the newly established ICMI (Association of Indonesian Muslim
intellectuals) which he requested his closest cabinet and personal confidant, B.J.
Habibie, to chair.12 Following the election of 1993, which made him President for a
sixth presidential term, Suharto appointed many members of ICMI to his cabinet
(1993-1998).13 At the personal level, Suharto as President of the largest Muslim
nation performed his pilgrimage and appeared in many events of Muslim
celebration such as Friday prayer, two significant days (Iedul-Fitr and Iedul-Adlha)
in the early 1990s.14 In fact, Suharto attempted to accommodate Islam as he turned
his orientation from pro western policy to south-south cooperation especially the
Middle Eastern countries in the mid 1990s.15
With the downfall of Suharto, the Muslim middle class have played an
increasingly significant role in Indonesian politics.16 They later on participated in
the ongoing reformation (reformasi) process from authoritarian political system into
liberal democratic political system. Some Islamic movements during the transitional
period established their own Islamic political parties with the abolition of Pancasila
as the sole ideology of mass and political organizations.17 As a result, the general
election in 1999, which was contested by 48 political parties included Islamic
political parties was successfully held. The 1999 election brought a number of
Muslims to the House of the Representatives Council (DPR) which elected a large
legitimate government to rule the country.18
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At the same time, the demise of the New Order Government saw the emergence
of significant fundamentalist groups. Four fundamentalist groups aim at the
implementation of shari’ah and making Islam the basic ideology of their movements.
These include Islamic Defenders’ Front (Fron Pembela Islam- FPI), Laskar Jihad,
Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, and Hizbut Tahrir. Islamic Defenders’ Fron (Front
Pembela Islam- FPI) was established to combat moral depravity spread in the capital
city. This movement was led by Habib Rizieq, an Arab Muslim descent who was
born in Jakarta. This Muslim organization arose against the incident in Tanjuk Priok
September 1983, but the official formation of the organization only dates from 17
august 1998. Their activities included protest and demonstration against the
government, asking them to close several night clubs in the city, disturbing people
who committed sinful acts such as adultery, consumption of alcohol and the like.
Furthermore this group also aims at the implementation of shari’ah in their private
as well as public life.19 Due to the accommodating attitude of the New Order
government towards its aspirations and interests in the 1990s up to the demise of
the New Order, these movements, especially Islamic Defenders’ Front (FPI) supported
Suharto and challenged Suharto’s opponents.
A different fundamentalist Muslim group emerged when the religious conflict
rocked the Maluku islands of East Indonesia, where the Christian and Muslims
community fought each other in 1999. The root cause of this conflict was due to
the perceived economic inequality between the two groups. Due to this incident,
the Muslim community established the so-called “Laskar Jihad”, an Islamic group
who were ready for holy war in the early months of 2000. The Ahlussunnah
Waljama’ah Communication Forum (Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah Waljama’ah) was
led by Ja’far Umar Thalib.20 This movement was dissolved when the conflict
diminished in 2003.
At the same time, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) also emerged as the
fundamentalist Muslim groups. This group was formed in Yogyakarta, in August
2000, led by Abu Bakar Baasyir, one of the founders of Ngruki Islamic boarding
school and alleged to be the leader (amir) who approved the bombings in Bali and
J. W. Marriot bombing respectively in 2002 and 2003. This group aims at the
implementation of Islamic shari’ah across Indonesia.21
Finally, Hizbut Tahrir is a political party whose ideology is based on Islam.
It is not however registered as an Islamic political party that participates in the
national election. In fact, it was established to restore the caliphate and God’s laws.
This group does not agree with liberal democracy. Hizbut Tahrir was established
in 1953 in Middle East especially Lebanon in response to the injunction of God
which says, “Let there be among you a group that invites to the good, orders what
is right and forbids what is evil, and they are those who are successful.”22
Its activities have been directed to resume the Islamic way of life and to
convey the Islamic da’wah to the word. Hizbut Tahrir attempts to shape behavior
in such a way that affairs of society are administered according to the shari’ah and
under the leadership of the Islamic state which is headed by a caliph. The members
of the party consist of Muslim men and women. They embrace Islam and carry
Islam and adopt its system regardless of nationality and madhhab (school of
thought).23
Significantly, these fundamentalist Islamic movements did not play a role in
the ongoing democratization process by maintaining their emphasis on dakwah and
cultural movements. Indeed, political Islam had been marginalized since the Guided
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Democracy era and severely treated in the early New Order era. Though Suharto
accommodated Muslims’ aspiration and interest and implemented a more open
political system in the 1990s, Islamic parties had not yet been formed. Upon the
demise of Suharto, the demand for reformation voiced by Muslim as well as non-
Muslim emphasized democratization, demilitarization of politics, and abolition of
Suharto’s influence, including Nepotism, Corruption and Coalition (Korupsi, Kolusi,
dan Nepotisme- KKN) that caused the economic and political crises.
In response to the call for reformation, Habibie announced that the chief
priority was to root out the KKN and to create a clean government. On the political
front, he highlighted five political laws of the previous political system, namely,
House of People Representative (DPR), the People Consultative Assembly (MPR),
political parties, regional administration and elections. Furthermore to be more
democracy, the law on subversive which had actually been used to eradicate
opponents, was revised.24 Habibie successfully established significant alteration to
the laws of the political system, including abolition of azas tunggal (Laws of the
Mass organization), and conducted the 1999 election, and introduced freedom for
press, upholding Human rights, and reduced the number of military political
representatives in the House of People Representative.
Upon the abolishment of the azas tunggal policy, which was created by
Suharto in 1985, Indonesia witnessed the emergence of hundreds of political parties,
many of them along religious lines.25 Nevertheless, only 48 parties qualified to
participate in the 1999 election. The classification of Islamic and non-Islamic political
parties was not easy.26 The Islamic political parties may be recognized by their basic
ideological foundation, name, and symbol. If one of these represents Islam then it
could be considered an Islamic political party. On this basis, 19 Islamic political
parties contested in the 1999 election.27
Out of these 19 Islamic parties, a few gained popular support in the 1999
election. PPP the long established Islamic party since the New Order secured the
highest vote 11%. The Crescent and Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang- PBB), which
was Masyumi’s successor, gained only 2%, and the Justice Party (Partai Keadilan-
PK), which represented what was known Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (LDK),
secured 1.5%, and the other Islamic parties received even small votes. Nevertheless,
The PKB and PAN which were known as Nationalist parties but led by prominent
Muslim leaders secured more votes with respectively 13% and 7%. While the
majority of votes were accumulated to the two other New Order parties namely,
Indonesian Democratic Party (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia - PDI-P) under the
leadership of Megawati, which won 35% of the vote and Golkar, the New Order
political party received 23% of the vote.
Subsequently, the election of 2004 resulted in a similar pattern of voting
position, where Islamic parties were defeated. But it is interesting to note that the
Justice and Welfare Party (PKS) which previously known as PK, gained more votes
compared to the 1999 election. It is partly because of its successful campaign to
convince people that they are clean and uncorrupted members. As a matter of fact,
the remaining Islamic parties, except PPP, secured fewer votes and they thus
disqualified from participating in the next election. PKB and PAN secured more or
less the same result as the 1999 election. Golkar won more votes than that of PDIP.
On the other hand, the new Democrat Party (PD) surprisingly secured more votes.
Partly because it’s presidential candidate Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono is a
charismatic general whom people admire. Despite the fact the 1999 election did
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not reside with Islamic parties, It gave the middle class Muslims controlled the
parliament. The middle class Muslims were represented in the HMI alumni in
several parties such as PBB, PAN, PPP and especially Golkar. Despite the fact the
Islamic parties did not perform well, middle class Muslims’ opinion was sufficiently
well represented in parties like PBB, PAN, PPP and Golkar.
This election to some extent reflected the Indonesian Muslim scenario.
Though there was growing Islamic awareness, this awareness was limited to
personal life, and not yet at the level of an Islamic state. As such, the increasing
awareness was just part of Islamic awakening. Secondly the Indonesian Muslim
Scholars have different opinions on the importance of building an Islamic state. The
softer line conservative and some Modernist Muslims such as Abdurrahman Wahid,
the former leader of the NU, Nurcholis Majid, the propagator of Islamic liberalism,
and lately even M. Amin Rais, the former leader of the modernist Muslims
Muhammadiyyah, did not agree with the formation of an Islamic state.28 On the
other hand, the other modernist Muslim groups such Islamic Defenders’ Fronts
(FPI), KISDI, DDII, and others suggest the promotion of the Islamic state. Finally
many Muslims, especially nominal Muslims in the urban areas rejected the Islamic
political parties, as it widely believed that if people vote after the Islamic party,
then they would not have freedom to enjoy the hedonistic life.
Moreover, many Muslim scholars considered the result of the 1999 election
a defeat of formal Islam that indicate that Islamic politics are not the choice of
Indonesian Muslims. However, Islam remained significant in Indonesian politics.
This was evident in several decision-making processes in the House of the
Representative. Nurcholis Majid shared the same view with Azyumardi Azra,
Muslim scholar and the former rector of Islamic State’s University, on the lack of
relevancy of formality and symbols of political Islam in present Indonesia. Azra
argues that most Indonesian Muslims are learning towards what he calls
“substantive Islam” rather than “formalistic Islam”.29
Since no party won an absolute majority, the election of a new president was
the result of complicated negotiations between the parties and other relevant actors,
including military. Amin Rais urged Islamic parties to forge an alliance between
PAN and the three major parties, PPP, PBB and PK known as the Central Axis (poros
tengah), which aimed at preventing Megawati from becoming a President for several
reasons: in term of gender in term of gender, there was strong opposition to the
idea of a woman president. Secondly was the fact that a high proportion of
Christians were in Megawati’s PDI-P and doubts about her own Islamicity.
Abdurrahman Wahid was therefore proposed as president by the central axis.
Nevertheless, Wahid could not able maintain his presidential position due to his
failure to tackle multiple domestic crises, social as well as economic. As a result he
was later impeached by the House of Representative, which was again controlled
by the central axis in 2001, for his involvement in Bulog gate, and corruption among
the circle of the president. This again led to unrest and demonstrations conducted
by Wahid’s supporters.
With the fall of Wahid, Megawati was appointed as the fifth president until
2004. Megawati was also supported by the central axis. Accordingly, the central
Axis played a significant role in determining Indonesian politics post-Suharto.
Despite the fact that Islamic political parties did not win the election, they were a
strongly influential factor in decision-making process, especially in the House of
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Representatives and thus demonstrated the ability of Islam to present itself as a
potent political force.
In line with the reformation of the 1945 constitution, the discussion of a new
constitution went on from 1999 to 2002. Fundamentalist Muslim groups demanded
the Jakarta Charter and the implementation of shari’ah. However, because moderate
modernist Muslims controlled the parliament, the proposal was not accepted.
Nevertheless, this proposal of the implementation of shari’ah was accepted to the
regional province level, where Makassar and Aceh were given autonomy to
implement the shari’ah.
MISSING LINK BETWEEN ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS IN INDONESIA
The Islamic movements in Indonesia post Suharto era have been principally divided
into two main groups; moderate Muslim groups which constitute the majority of
Muslims in Indonesia and fundamentalist or hardliner Muslim groups which only
emerged after the downfall of Suharto in 1998 onward.
In this context, that the oldest Islamic movement, Muhammadiyah since its
establishment has played an important role in Islamic politics: as a religious reform
movement, as an agent of social change and as a political force. As religious
reformist, Muhammadiyah aimed at purifying the Islamic faith removing
superstitious practices and traditional admixtures. It basically calls the Muslims
in Indonesia to embrace guidance directly from the Qur’an and Sunnah. In this
respect it is no more than a religious revivalist movement.30
Secondly as an agent of social change, Muhammadiyah aimed at modernizing
the Indonesian Muslim community in order to lift it up from its backwardness to
a place of respectability in the modern world. As such Muhammadiyah has
struggled to improve the Muslim education system. Muhammadiyah has
established various schools and universities. On the other hand, Muhammadiyah
also concerned with social welfare. As such, Muhammadiyah has actively
contributed to the field of health and care of orphans.
Finally, as a political force Muhammadiyah is considered a major interest
group in Indonesian politics. As highlighted in its philosophical view of Islam, Islam
did not separate religion from politics. As a result, Muhammadiyah could not
completely disengage itself from political matters. As a matter of fact, the leaders
of Muhammadiyah throughout history have been involved in politics. The latest
example is the former chairman of Muhammadiyah Amien Rais who was also a
leader of “reformasi” in pursuing more democratic Indonesia. However,
Muhammadiyah as a mass organization remains non-political, though its members
may play roles in various political parties, especially PAN (Partai Amanah
Nasional), a party which was established by Amien Rais.
On the other hand, Nahdlatual Ulama (NU) is an organization of immense
diversity, complexity and size, claiming a membership of over 40 millions people
and aims at preserving local Indonesian tradition. Consequently, NU received more
support from poor families most of them are farmers and located at the village level.
Unlike Muhammadiyah, NU’s membership was only loosely affiliated with
organization, holding emotional attachment rather than membership cards. As such
NU has later on been an organization which has a heterogeneous membership in
term of social origins, political affiliation, and religious outlook. The main activity
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of NU has been in Traditional Islamic education in the form of Islamic boarding
schools (pesantren). NU is known as traditional and conservative Muslim
organization.
Unlike Muhammadiyah, the social activity of NU has been relatively
decentralized here the personalistic and informal networks and authority of
individual kiai and ulama or religious leaders and scholars play their role in the
spiritual, moral and religious development of santri. With its relative loose
membership, many members of NU have accepted liberal pluralism. As a result,
the current youth wing of NU has been very much liberal.31
Analyzing the two moderate Muslim organizations, I find that though they
have a different emphasis and approach to Dakwah, they share certain
commonalities. Both movements have a tendency to encourage be fanatical leaders
to the movement. A member of Muhammadiyah for example, has to some extent
accepted whatever decisions made by the movement’s leaders, instead of
understanding the other movement reason. Likewise, NU’s members listen to their
own religious leaders. As a result there have been many incidents where physical
conflict between members of these two movements has occurred.
In such movements, the line between commitment to the movement and
commitment to Islam itself is not only blurred but completely eliminated. This
distorted cognition naturally leads to members loving their leader as Amir of the
faithful and give him complete obedience in carrying out any orders irrespective
of their irrationality. This phenomenon is actually a product of misinformation that
may lead to destructive emotions and spiritual deprivation.
In contrast, the fundamentalist Muslim groups which emerged after the
collapse of Suharto regime have adopted a different approach from the mainstream
of Islamic movements. These groups basically demand the government adopt and
implement shari’ah (Islamic laws) in Indonesia or at least govern the society
according to Islamic values. These groups are as we have seen Lasykar Jihad which
was established for certain purpose “jihad in Ambon”, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia,
Fron Pembela Islam and Hizbut Tahrir. These groups have been known by non-
Muslims and some Muslims writers as hard line Muslim groups. Their dakwah has
been consistently to compensate “Al-Nahyu ‘An al-Munkar”.32
Analysis shows that these groups stress only certain aspect of Islamic
knowledge, emphasizing the Aqidah and the fiqh of halal and haram. Though they
do not depreciate the importance of the practical behavior component of
worshipping God, they limit it to a shortened cognitive view. They are generally
obsessed with external exactness performing ritual performance but not with the
internal surrendering mind and submitting heart since they usually ignore the
affective and spiritual factors of Islam. It is as if Islam to them is nothing but a
code of laws to be carried out without feeling. These groups increasingly constrict
the cognitive and practical and disregard the affective and spiritual aspects.
CONCLUSION
Undoubtedly, the Islamic movement in Indonesia is not a monolith. Islamic
movements need to be able to tackle the internal as well as external forces that seek
to stop dynamic leadership from unifying Islam. With the emergence of challenges
from the non-Muslim western community, the Islamic movements need to integrate
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their vision and mission so that each Islamic movement can establish a network
that understands, and respects whilst gradually establishing a network that can
comprehend and embrace the other.
ENDNOTES
1 Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java, (New York: Free Press, 1960), p. 5. This study is based
on field study in Mojokuto, East Java, Indonesia in the 1950s.
2 Douglas E. Ramage, Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance,
(London and New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 16; see also Michael Vatikiotis, Indonesian
Politics under Suharto: Order, Development, and Presurre for Change, (London and New York:
Routledge, 1993), p. 125.
3 Jalaluddin Rakhmat, “Islam di Indonesia: Masalah Definisi,” in M. Amien Rais (ed.), Islam
di Indonesia: Suatu Ikhtiar Mengaca Diri, (Jakarta: Rajawali, 1986), p. 42.
4 For further reading on the modernist Muslim, See Deliar Noer, Modernist Muslim Movement
in Indonesia, 1900 – 1942, (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1973).
5 For further reading on the traditionalist Movements in Indonesia, see Greg Barton and
Greg Feally (eds.), Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditionalist Islam and Modernity in Indonesia, (Clayton:
Monash Asia Institute, Monash University, 1996).
6 Malik Badri, “Islamic Movements of the Future: Towards Formation of the aspired New
World Order”, a paper presented at International Round Table Conference on “The Future
of the aspired ew World Order” at the International Islamic university Malaysia, on 16-17
March 2003, p. 14.
7 Malik Badri, “Islamic Movements of the Future”, p. 11.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., p. 13.
10 Among the significants changes are incresaed number of Muslim middle class, the
acceptance of Muslims towards Pancasila as the sole idoelogy of the state, and the
weakening support from the military fractions for Suharto’s presidenship. For further
discussion on the shift, see Douglas E. Ramage, Politics in Indonesia; Bahtiar Effendy, Islam
and the State in Indonesia, (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003), pp. 147-192.
11 Bahtiar Effendy, Islam and the State, p. 157. for further reading on the Islamic Courts in
Indonesia, see Daniel S. Lev, Islamic Courts in Indonesia: A Study of the Political Bases of Legal
Institutions, (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1972);
“Sejarah Peradial Agama”, in Media Dakwah, (August 1989), pp. 38-39; M. Dawud Ali,
“Undang-Undang Peradialan Agama: Sistematik dan Garis-Garis Besar isinya”, Media
Dakwah, (April 1990), pp. 18-26.
12 For further discussion on the establsihment of ICMI, see for example, Nasrullah Ali Fauzi
(ed.), ICMI: Antara Statusuo dan Demokratisasi, (Bandung: Mizan, 1995). See also Robert W.
Hefner, “Islam and State, and Civil Society: ICMI and the Struggle for Indonesian Middle
Class”, in Indonesia, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, no. 56, (October 1993), pp. 1-35;
Mitsuo Nakamura, “The Emrgence of Islamizing Middle Class and the Dialectics of Political
Islam in the New Order of Indonesia: Prelude to Formation of the ICMI” (Paper delivered
at the conference on Islam and the social Construction of Indentities: Comparative
Perspectives on Southeast Asian Muslims, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, University
of Hawaii, 4-6 August 1993).
157
Lili Yulyadi Arnakim - The Leadership of Islamic Movements in Indonesia Post-Suharto Era
13 Out of forty members of the cabinet Ministers, there are only three non-Muslims Cabinet
Ministers. For further detail out the full list of Suharto’s cabinets, see The Editor, “The sixth
Development Cabinet Announced March 17, 1993”, in Indonesia, Cornell Modern Indonesia
Project, no. 55, (April 1993), pp. 167-176; see also Leo Suryadinata, Interpreting Indonesian
Politics, (Singapore: Time Academic Press, 1998), pp. 239-247.
14 Douglas E. Ramage, Politics in Indonesia, p. 63.
15 Riza Sihbudi, Indonesia – Timur Tengah: Maslah dan Prospek, (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press,
1997), p. 76.
16 For further enlightenment on the Indonesian middle class, see Daniel S. Lev, “Intermediate
Classes and Change in Indonesia: Some Initial Reflection”, in Richard Tanter and Kenneth
Young (eds.), Politics of Middle Class Indonesia, (Clayton: Center for Southeast Asian Studies,
Monash University, 1990), pp. 24-43; Howard W. Dick, “The Rise of Middle Class”, in
Indonesia, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, no. 39, (1985); Mitsuo Nakamura, “The
Emrgence of Islamizing Middle Class and the Dialectics of Political Islam in the New Order
of Indonesia: PreLude to Formation of the ICMI.”
17 This policy was made by President Habibie as response to the demands of democratization
process upon the reformasi era. For further reading on the Habibie’s reformation, see Ahmad
Watik. Pratiknya, Umar Juoro and Indria Samego, (eds.), Pandangan dan Langkah Reformasi
B.J. Habibie. (Jakarta: PT RajaGrafindo Persada, 1999).
18 Number of Muslims in the DPR is 82.5%. Out of 500 members of DPR, 412 members are
Muslims from various Islamic and nationalist political parties. For further the detailed profile
of the members of DPR period 1999-2004, see Kompas, October 1999; Biro Komisi Pemilihan
Umum, Biodata Anggota DPR-MPR Republik Indonesia Periode 1999-2004, (Jakarta, 1999), pp.
1-255; Forfurther analysis of the Indonesian 1999 election, see Leo Suryadinata, Election and
Politics in Indonesia, (Singapore: ISEAS, 2002); Aris Ananata, et. al., Emerging Democracy in
Indonesia, (Singapore: ISEAS, 2005), pp. 9-15.
19 Jamhari, “Mapping Radical,” p. 10-12.
20 For further reading on Laskar Jihad see Michael Davis, “Laskar Jihad and The Political
Position of Conservative Islam in Indonesia,” in Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 24, No. 1
(April 2002), pp. 12-32.
21 Jamhari, “Mapping Radical,” pp. 14-15.
22 Qur’an: 3:104.
23 See http://hib-ut-tahrir.org/english/english.html, visited on March 07, 2006.
24 For further reading on the reformation, see Ahmad Watik Pratiknya, Umar Juoro and
Indria Samego (eds.), Pandangan dan Langkah Reformasi B.J. Habibie, (Jakarta: PT RajaGrafindo
Persada, 1999); Bilveer Singh, Succession Politics, pp. 155-236.
25 There were 126 parties registered in 1999. see Ibid., pp. 171 – 181; Adil: Tabloid Berita
Mingguan vol. 13, no. 67, (30 December 1998 – 5 January 1999), p. 8.
26 In the Old Order Era, Islamic parties were based on Islam. It could be seen from its
ideological and basic foundation of the parties such as Masyumi, the NU, Persatuan Tarbiyah
Islamiyah (PTI), and Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia (PSII). In the early New Order there
were NU, PTI, PSII and Partai Muslimin Indonesia (PMI), which later on fused in the United
Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP). The basis of the respective party
was Islam except PPP which later on based on Pancasila and thus the Islamic political party
did not exist totally since early the 1980s.
27 The list of Islamic political parties, see Sudirman Tebba, Islam Menuju, p. xx-xxi
158
Jati, Vol. 12, December 2007
28 Nurcholis Majid is known as ‘Cha Nur’, graduated from Chicago university and has been
known as the propagator of Islamic liberal and secular Islam. as he proposed in the 1970s
the separation of politics from the religion as he expressed it in his popular essay “Islamic
Yes: Political Islam NO”.
29 Azyumardi Azra, “The Megawati Presidency: Challenge of Political Islam,” in Hadi
Soesastro, Anthony L. Smith and Han Mui Ling (Eds.), Government in Indonesia: Challenges
Facing the Megawati Presidency, (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003), p. 63.
30 Alfian, Muhammadiyah: The political behavior of a Muslim Modernist Organization Under Dutch
Colonialism, (Yogyakata: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1989), p.5.
31 It has been evident in the establishment of JIL, Jaringan Islam liberal, which was
established seven years ago under the leadershipof Ulil Abashar Abdallah.
32 Interview with Habib Rizieq, leader and founder of Islamic Defenders’ Front (FPI), Kuala
Lumpur on January 12, 2007.
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ARNAKIM, Lili Yulyadi. THE LEADERSHIP OF ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS IN INDONESIA POSTSUHARTO: IDENTIFYING THE MISSING LINK BETWEEN THE MOVEMENTS. JATI - JOURNAL OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES, [S.l.], v. 12, p. 147-160, dec. 2007. ISSN 2600-8653. Available at: <http://jati.um.edu.my/index.php/jati/article/view/5738>. Date accessed: 21 aug. 2018.
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